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FILLING AND BUILDING ON SMALL LAKES
-TIME FOR JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE CONTROLSt
Ralph W. Johnson*
G. Richard Morry"
During this new decade, Americans will, and indeed must, become

increasingly concerned about the preservation of open spaces and the
maintenance of a habitable environment. The lack of adequate open

space in metropolitan areas is already particularly disturbing. Despite
years of planning and zoning, the few remaining open areas in American cities continue to succumb to developmental pressures. In some
communities the existence of lakes constitutes an important exception
to this history of failure. Lakes are natural open spaces and are more
difficult to destroy, br encroach upon, than dry land areas, and, as
such, they offer a special dimension of beauty, color, and recreational

potential to metropolitan residents. But recently, even lakes have
come to be damaged and destroyed, for population growth and investment potential have combined to attract the attention of developers,
who are now commencing, with fills and buildings, to invade and
diminish these natural open areas.'
To date the law has given little notice to this problem. In the past,
lake law has been preoccupied with questions of consumptive use,
and more recently with disputes between recreational users.' Widet The authors are indebted to the Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C., for its
generous financial support of this research. Although Professor Johnson was associated as
co-counsel for the appellants in Bach v. Sarich on appeal, he co-authors this article not
as an advocate but as a commentator on the need for policy development in this area.
An earlier and somewhat different version of this article has been previously published.
Johnson & Morry, New Small Lake Law: Open Space and Recreation v. Filling and
Building, in CONTEwORARY DEVEL Oi mETS IN WAER LAW (Center for Research in Water
Resources, Water Resources Symposium No. 4) (C. Johnson & S. Lewis eds. 1970).
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; Diploma, Lehigh, 1945; B.S. in Law,
1947, LL.B., 1949, Oregon.
** 3rd year law student, University of Washington; B.A., 1965, University of Washington.
'It is not only the lakes in the older metropolitan areas that are in danger of suffering
this fate, but also the formerly rural lakes now enveloped by the radiation of suburban
areas out from the city cores.
2For a general discussion of the shift of water law from preoccupation with irrigation
and other consumptive uses to the newer water uses, such as recreation and homesites,
see Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights in Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsHr. L. REv. 580,
583-86 (1960). For a detailed analysis and proposed solution to the problem of recre-
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spread filling and building over lake beds is still too recent a phenomenon for much case law to have developed; and, despite the quickening pace of such encroachments, and the increasing publicity given
to the problem, urban planners and other officials have not yet taken
the necessary remedial action.4 This lack of any articulated legal thinking on the topic, and our belief that regulation of lake surface invasions
must begin soon, if it is ever to succeed, prompted us to investigate the
problem. Here we will attempt to identify the more important issues
and to suggest possible solutions.
Our primary focus is on small natural lakes,' that are nonnavigable
for title.6 Restriction of our discussion to lakes, of course, excludes
ational use see Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958
Wis. L. Rav. 542 (1958).
The reader interested in these traditional water use problems may consult other pieces
previously appearing in this Review. Corker and Roe, Washington's New Water Rights
Law-Improvements Needed, 44 WAsnr. L. REV. 85 (1968); Note, The Tale of Two
Lakes-A New Chapter in Washington Water Law, 43 WASH. L. Rlv. 475 (1967); Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsiH. L. REv. 580 (1960);
Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 243 (1956); Horowitz,
Riparian and Appropriation Rights to the Use of Water in Washington, 7 WAsH. L. REv.
197 (1932).
'For an example of the increasing press attention being given to the problem of filling
and building on water surfaces see the article on fills on navigable Lake Chelan in The
Seattle Times, Jan. 4, 1970, § D, at 1, Col. 1.
'In correspondence with a number of West and Mid-West cities and counties over the
summer and fail of 1968, we found that none had as yet initiated serious study on the
control of small privately owned lakes. Several of the cities, however, had achieved an
early and permanent solution by acquisition of title to the lake beds and surrounding
upland for park purposes-notably Minneapolis and St. Louis.
Our concern is with lakes and not with rivers. In many instances the law appears to
be generally the same for both types of water bodies. However, factual differences between lakes and streams, and the way people use them, cause different types of problems
to arise. For example, on lakes there is ordinarily no strong flow of water, and thus no
physical or hydrological necessity for a channel. A lake, especially a small one, can be
completely filled in, or at least significantly changed by fills and structures. Ordinarily
on rivers the danger of floods and the shifting of channels is sufficient to keep homeowners from building too close to them. This is not true as to lakes. Lakes are also
usually safer for recreational activities because of the lack of current. Lakes, in general,
have a considerably different appearance and provide a different aesthetic value than do
streams. All of these factors, we believe, justify separate treatment of lake problems, at
least in the content of the conflict between filling and building and other water uses.
'As used in this article "navigability," unless otherwise specified, means navigability
for title in the federal sense as defined in United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931);
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) ; and United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). For a full discussion of the various concepts
of navigability see Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NATURAL RasouRcas J. 1, 8-33 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Johnson & Austin]. In that article the authors summarized their analysis of the title navigability cases by observing that
• . navigability for title should be considered separately from navigability for
commerce clause or other purposes.
There are four criteria for navigability for title:

Filling and Building on Small Lakes
water bodies too small to be labeled "lakes." No hard and fast definition of "lake" can be derived from the case law, but, intuitively, it
is clear, that at some point, a water body will be obviously so small,
shallow, or useless, that the established rules of lake law will not be
applied The term "natural" also excludes artificial lakes, which
present peculiar problems not necessarily resolvable in the natural lake
context.8 We have examined primarily cases dealing with small non(1) Navigability for title is determined as of the date each state came into the
Union. ,
(2) Such navigability is determined by the natural and ordinary condition of the
water at that time, not whether it could be made navigable by artificial improvements. However, the fact that rapids, rocks, or other obstructions make navigation
difficult will not destroy title navigability so long as the waters were usable for a
significant portion of the time.
(3) Navigability in intrastate commerce is all that is required, not usability in
interstate commerce.
(4) The waters must be usable by the "customary modes of trade or travel on
water." This may include waters usable for commercial log floating. This includes
waters as little as three or four feet deep that are geographically located so they
have been, or can be used by canoes and rowboats for commercial trade and travel
(fur traders' canoes). This does not include waters which are difficult of access because of surrounding mud flats or the like, and which are geographically isolated
from habitation and transportation routes, and which have never been and are not
likely to be used for commercial trade or travel. This probably does not include
waters that are geographically isolated from habitation and transportation routes
and which have never been and are not likely to be used for commercial trade or
travel, even though these waters are deep enough and large enough to float commercial type vessels, and are not physically inaccessible because of mud flats or the
like.
Johnson
& Austin, supra at 24-25.
7
The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided what seems to be a reasonable definition

of the problem and a suggested criterion:
It does not follow that the foregoing riparian rights rule applies to every pothole
or swamp frequented by wild fowl and over which a small boat might be poled to
retrieve game, but which as a practical matter does not lend itself in any substantial
degree to the customary propulsion of boats by outboard motors or oars. A minor
body of water which by its very nature and character reasonably has no overall
utility common to two or more abutting owners would fall outside the rule. No
hard-and-fast line can be drawn and each case must be determined according to its
own peculiar facts.
Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 697 (1960). The court was address-

ing itself to the scope of the rule of common use which it was adopting, but, given our

aim to draw a distinction on the basis of water bodies which do not possess the customary water law incidents, the language is most appropriate for present purposes.
'The general rule as to artificial water bodies, including lakes, is that their beds
may be used as if dry land, and that abutting land owners have no riparian rights. See,
e.g., Brasher v. Gibson, 101 Ariz. 326, 419 P.2d 505, 509 (1966); Kray v. Muggli, 84
Minn. 90, 86 N.W. 882 (1901). For general treatment and citation of authorities on
artificial water bodies see Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo.
L. REv. 93 (1951); Murphy, A Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United
States, 1961 WAS. U.L.Q. 93, 117-20 (1961); VI-A A!rascAN LAW OP PROPE"TY,

§ 28.55, at 157 n.8 (A. Casner ed. 1954).
Rights of use similar to those on natural lakes may be obtained, however, in various

ways. E.g., Greisinger v. Klinhart, 321 Mo. 86, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928)

(reciprocal ease-
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navigable lakes; however, some of the same considerations are relevant
to "navigable" lakes as well. 9 That this is so is illustrated by the
recent Washington decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher," where the
supreme court required removal of a fill on a privately-owned portion
of the bed of navigable Lake Chelan." This case plainly suggests that
the "navigability" vel non of a lake for title purposes may, in the
future, play a less important role in the field of lake law than it has
in the past. 2 Nevertheless, the traditional differential treatment13 acments arising out of severance of common tract on which the entire artificial lake was
located); Wilson v. Owen, 261 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1953) (plat dedication); Bradley v.
County of Jackson, 347 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1961) (deed reservation); Silver Blue Lake
Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners' Ass'n, 225 So. 2d 557 (Fla. App.
1969) (per curiam) (home owners' association).
The Washington Supreme Court has also recently accorded equality of treatment to
the natural and artificial water levels of navigable Lake Chelan, Washington. Wilbour
v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 314-17, 462 P.2d 232, 237-39 (1969). This case is
discussed in Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public PermissionWashington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WAsH. L. Rav. 651 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 9Corked.
The problems of filling and building on navigable for title lakes and salt water bodies
is discussed in another article appearing in this issue of the Review. Corker, supra note 8.
" 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). The case is extensively treated in Corker,
supra note 8.
'The fill was ordered to be removed on the grounds that it interfered with the public
right of navigation ". . . together with its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming,
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to
the right of navigation and the use of public waters." Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.
Dec. 2d at 317, 462 P.2d at 239. In Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968),
an apartment building extending over the surface of a nonnavigable lake was ordered
to be removed on a similar ground i.e. interference with common rights of riparian
owners to boat, fish, and swim over the entire surface of the lake. Bach was not cited
in Wilbour, however. The Bach case is discussed at notes 14-18, 65-67 and accompanying
text infra.
'Analytically, as pointed out in Corker, supra note 8, there are sound arguments to
support this view. For a brief comment on the historical trend in the State of Washington towards equal treatment of navigable and nonnavigable lakes as to filling and
building see note 13 infra.
"Illustrative of such a difference in treatment is that riparian owners on nonnavigable
lakes, until recent decisions to the contrary, have generally been permitted to build
structures of various types on their privately owned lake beds. Riparians on navigable
lakes, however, lacking bed title, have ordinarily been restricted to structural uses which
are deemed riparian, the most common being the right to wharf out to the line of navigability. See, e.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915). If,
however, the navigable lake riparian did acquire title to the bed, his structural use rights
became comparable to the nonnavigable riparian's. Ironically, the recent developments
of increased alienation of the beds of navigable lakes and the judicial restriction of nonnavigable filling and building rights in the case of Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445
P.2d 648 (1968), forecast a situation in reverse of the original, one in which the navigable riparian would have greater filling and building rights than the nonnavigable
riparian.
The Washington situation is particularly interesting. Prior to Bach, supra, riparians
on nonnavigable lakes assumedly could fill and build as they pleased owing to their
ownership of the bed. However, land owners abutting navigable lakes not only did not
have bed title, but also lacked riparian rights due to the decision in Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 253, 26 P. 539 (1891), which held that under the Washington Con-
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corded to navigable and nonnavigable lakes does persist, and this
article will center on. the nonnavigable lakes.
A recent Washington decision illustrates many of the considerations
which we wish to examine here and reveals one court's resolution of
these problems. In Bach v. Sarich,'4 defendants sought to construct
an apartment building over the surface of Bitter Lake on a portion of
the bed which they owned. The apartment would have extended from
the upland on to fill and then on to a pier, to a total distance of about
180 feet from shore. Bitter Lake is a small, 19 acre, nonnavigable lake
in Seattle. Plaintiffs were riparian owners on the lake who sought to
enjoin defendants from constructing the apartment building; they
argued that the common right of use held by riparians' 5 created an
easement-type interest over the whole lake surface and that defendants
thus had no right to build an apartment over any portion of the lake
bed.
The trial court ruled for plaintiffs, holding that their common right
of use extended over the whole lake, and enjoined defendants from
building their apartment over any portion of the lake. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion establishing a new and
significant rule of law.
Defendants had argued that, as riparian owners holding title to
both the bank and the bed under the proposed apartment site, they
had 'a "riparian right" to make use of the lake overlying their portion
of the bed. They contended that this right was limited only by the
stitution no riparian rights attached to ownership of lands bordering on navigable waters.
Thus, the navigable abutter could not even erect riparian structures such as wharves.
In part to ameliorate the harshness of this decision, the state began selling the beds of
navigable waters to upland owners, giving the owners rights to erect structures without
any limit to riparian uses. At this point upland owners on both navigable and nonnavigable lakes bad effectually unlimited building rights on their lake beds. Then along
came Back, supra, which restricted riparians on nonnavigable lakes to riparian structural
uses, giving rise to the ironic reversal mentioned in the last paragraph. The final step
came in Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 239 (1969) in which it was
held that at least all fills and structures not affirmatively authorized by zoning ordinances
or harbor lines were impermissable interferences with a public right of navigation.
Thus, at least to some extent, navigable and nonnavigable upland owners are back at
parity, but this time with equally limited rights to fill and build as opposed to equally
unlimited ones.
"74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
'Under a rule of common use, each riparian owner on a nonnavigable lake has a
right in common to use the entire surface of the lake. Washington had adhered to the
rule in an earlier case, Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956). The
right is categorized in the opinions as one of property, apparently in the nature of an
easement, although the character of the interest has never been precisely defined. The
rule is discussed at text accompanying notes 28-45 infra.
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concept of "reasonableness," and that their structure was "reasonable"
under the circumstances. Defendants further asserted that the issue
of reasonableness had been foreclosed in their favor by the enactment
of a zoning ordinance designating their portion of the bed for apartment use; this ordinance constituting a legislative determination that
an apartment was a reasonable use of the lake bed.
The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that
the proposed apartment was not a "riparian" use at all and that,
therefore, under no condition could it be considered "reasonable."
Furthermore, because the apartment was not a riparian use, said the
court, it could not be built over any portion of the lake bed. The
court explained:"6
Mere proximity of the apartment to the water does not render it a
riparian use. With respect to a structure, such a use must be so intimately
associated with the water that apart from the water its utility would be
seriously impaired. ... The utility of the apartment is in no way dependent

upon the waters of Bitter Lake, and its utility as an apartment would be
in no way impaired apart from this lake.
Although the court did not explicitly say so, it seems clear that this
rule would not per se bar construction of docks, piers, or even boat
marinas on a lake. Such uses would be "riparian" and controlled by
the rule of "reasonableness.' 7
The court also rejected the defendants zoning argument, saying
that although the city ".

.

. might regulate the exercise of [plaintiffs'

riparian rights to boat, fish, and swim, etc.] by means of its police
power, it may not totally divest plaintiffs of them through the mechanism of zoning."'
74 Wn. 2d at 579-80, 445 P.2d at 651.
,Discussed in text accompanying notes 51-64 infra.
Is 74 Wn. 2d at 580, 445 P.2d at 652.
The court was also convinced that the zoning of the lake in the case was inadvertant
and that the city of Seattle had never actually thought about the specific question of
construction on the lake bed or how zoning might affect that question.
A number of other issues were also raised in the case, having to do with adverse possession, laches, hardship, and good faith, but these issues are not relevant to our present
discussion. However, one of the principal issues was whether the defendant-builders
should be able to keep their apartment in place in view of the fact that most of the
actual construction had occurred after a motion for preliminary injunction to halt construction had been dismissed, but before the main trial. The court declined to hold that
the defendants were in bad faith, but nonetheless felt that they had proceeded with
knowledge that a court decision might go against them and thus took the chance that
a court might order removal of the structure. The loss to the defendants through removal was alleged to be about $250,000.00.
'
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The effect of this decision is to effectively and permanently "zone"
the total surface areas of all nonnavigable lakes in the State of Washington for "water-related" uses only. No homes, apartments, businesses
(unless location on the lake is essential to their operation, such as
boat marinas), or other activities not "intimately associated with
the water" may be conducted on fills or piers over the waters of these
lakes. Presumably, this rule would also bar any fill designed to increase the size of a yard, parking lot, driveway, or whatever, where
the use to be made of the filled area is not "intimately associated
with the water."
A search of authorities in other jurisdictions has revealed no other
case in the nation like this one, 'and only a few that are closely related. 9 This dearth of authority seems surprising in view of the present
competition for lake surface use rights between recreationists, builders,
and homeowners 9 But the present rate of metropolitan population
growth and geographic expansion will doubtless intensify this competition and increase the probability of litigation on this subject. With
this in mind, we have structured our following discussion to consider,
first, judicial limitations on filling and building over nonnavigable lake
surfaces, and, second, possible legislative solutions.
I. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON FILLING AND BUILDING
ON NONNAVIGABLE LAKE BEDS
The competition between recreationists and developers for the use
of nonnavigable lake surfaces has generally revolved around the
central conflict between property rights derived from ownership of
The only other case directly centered on the issue of fills and buildings over nonnavigable lake surfaces is Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946), and
that case involved filling only. See discussion notes 68-73 and accompanying text binra.
Another case involved in part a dirt fill designed to fence off a neighboring riparian from
use of a nonnavigable lake surface. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959), aff'g
107 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Profitably comparable is the recent Washington case involving fills in navigable lake waters. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d
307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). The case is discussed in Corker, supra note 8.
A partial explanation for the absence of additional decisions is that many cities have
reserved all or some of their lakes for public parks, preventing private development.
St. Louis and Minneapolis are examples. A further reason is that many jurisdictions in
the populous Eastern United States grant the nonnavigable lake bed owner an exclusive
use of his bed and the overlying waters, leaving the recreational riparian without grounds
to protest fills and buildings placed on privately-owned lake beds. See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
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lake bottoms and riparian rights to recreational use stemming from
ownership of lake front property (and, in some jurisdictions, the
public's right of navigation stemming from public access to the lake).
This central controversy, which is our primary concern in this article,
can arise only when two conditions exist: (1) lake beds in private
ownership; and (2) a riparian or public right to use the entire lake
surface for recreational purposes. Thus, we do not purport to deal
with the situation in those states (such as Wisconsin) where title to
lake beds is held "in trust" by the state for all the people, 2 ' nor the
situation in the "Great Pond" jurisdictions (such as Massachusetts,
Maine, and New Hampshire) where most lake beds are reserved for
public ownership.22 We have also excluded from our consideration the
so-called "eastern" or common law jurisdictions in which the owner of
a portion of a nonnavigable lake bed has an exclusive right to use the
bed and the waters overlying it. Under this strict property concept,
other riparians and members of the general public have no right to
use waters overlying privately-owned beds, and they may be excluded
"It has been long-settled in Wisconsin that the beds of navigable for use lakes up to
ordinary high water mark are held in trust for the people by the state, although the
owner of land abutting a stream has a qualified title to the bed to the thread of the
stream. Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 84 N.W. 855, 856-57 (1901); Ne-pee-nauk
Club v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 290, 71 N.W. 661 (1897). For more recent discussion see Muench
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1952); Baker v. Voss, 217
Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 413 (1935). Wisconsin's test of navigability for use would appear
to be less stringent than the federal test, requiring only that a "sawlog" or a "shallow
draft boat" be able to float on a stream or lake surface. Muench, supra, 53 N.W.2d at
516-21. See Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958
Wis. L. REv. 335, 337-40 (1958). Technically, Wisconsin would thus appear to be claiming ownership of lake beds which under the federal test (see note 6 supra) should have
passed into private ownership. Wisconsin does allow some fills and buildings on state
beds under a permit system. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.11-.13 (1964, Supp. 1969).
In Iowa a rather unusual situation exists as to the beds of meandered, but nonnavigable lakes, which under Iowa law are apparently considered to have remained under
the control of the federal government at statehood and not to have passed into private
ownership. Nonnavigable unmeandered lakes, however, are deemed to have passed into
private ownership. Note, Fishing and Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams,
53 IOWA L. REv. 1322, 1328-30 (1968).
'In some New England states any lake containing more than 10 acres (in some cases
20 acres) is considered a "Great Pond," the bed of which is reserved for public ownership. The root of this doctrine is the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Colonial Ordinance of
1641-47, either as legislation or as a matter of common law adoption. However, an
abutting land owner has been said to have ". . . the right to build wharves and other
structures into the pond for his own use, to an extent that would not unreasonably interfere with the right of the public in the pond." Dolbeer v. Suncook Waterworks Co.,
72 N.H. 562, 58 A. 504, 506 (1904) (dictum). See Musgrove v. Cicco, 96 N.H. 141, 71
A.2d 495, 496 (1950). For a general discussion relative to Massachusetts and Maine see
M. FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE, WATERS AND WATER COURSES: MAiNE AND MASSACHUsETTs 106-122 (1969).
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by fencing. Thus, in these Eastern States, the bed owner can fill or
build as he pleases." A similar rule apparently prevails in those arid
Western States, which do not recognize either riparian rights or a
public navigation easement over nonnavigable waters.2
By elimination, we will therefore emphasize the situation in only
those jurisdictions (mainly western) which recognize private ownership of nonnavigable lake beds and also afford riparians (and possibly
the public generally) common rights to use the whole surface of nonnavigable lakes for recreational purposes. In these jurisdictions, title
to the bed of a nonnavigable lake may be derived from a specific
point-and-line deed grant, or from a presumption that a conveyance
of the upland also transfers ownership of the bed to the center of the
lake2 5 Riparian rights, on the other hand, generally accrue from
ownership of the upland alone2 6 Although some jurisdictions require
ownership of a portion of the bed,2 7 this requirement will be immaterial

'For cases representative of the eastern rule see, e.g., Baker v. Normanach Ass'n, 25
N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957); Miller v. Lutheran Conference Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241,
200 A. 646, 649-50 (1938) (artificial lake, but court dealt with as if natural); Commonwealth Water Co. v. Brunner, 175 App. Div. 153, 161 N.Y.S. 794, 798 (1916); Lembeck
v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890). Rights to use the waters over the private
bed in an eastern rule jurisdiction can be acquired by deed or contract. See, e.g., Sheahan
v. Upper Greenwood Lake Property Owners' Ass'n, 36 N.J. Super 133, 115 A.2d 129
(1955) (deed covenant). For a good brief comparison of this common law rule and
the opposing civil or "common use" rule see Note, Extent of Private Rights in NonNavigable Lakes, 5 U. F.A. L. Rnv. 166, 176-78 (1952).
'See, e.g., Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905); Herrin v. Sutherland,
74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925) (both cases involved nonnavigable streams, however).
See also cases cited Johnson and Austin, supra note 6, at 44-45. As to Colorado, for an
argument for recreational rights on an appropriation theory see Note, Water for Recreation: A Plea for Recognition, 44 Dmvxa L.J. 288 (1967).
'See, e.g., Bauman v. Barendregt, 251 Mich. 67, 231 N.W. 70, 71 (1930). The rule
has been called one of "almost universal recognition." 1 WATERS AND WATER RiGHTS
§ 41.3(A) (R. Clark ed. 1967). For additional cases see id. at 261 n.87. For a general
treatment see Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 Mnmm. L. REv.
305 (1940).
'See, e.g., Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 579, 445 P.2d 648, 651 (1968); Johnson v.
Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1960); Bradley v. County of Jackson,
347 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. 1961) (artificial lake); Morris, Washington Water RightsA Sketch, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 243, 244 (1956). Riparian rights are also presumed incident
to upland ownership in Wisconsin, but there by necessity given public ownership of lake
beds. See Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 138 N.W.2d 197, 203 (1965). Recognition of
the civil law rule of common use has been said to necessarily imply that riparian recreational rights are derived from shore rather than bed ownership. Note, Fishing and
Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams, 53 IowA L. Rxv. 1322, 1343 (1968).
-'See,e.g., Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744, as modified
180 Neb. 569, 144 N.W.2d 209 (1966) (stream). Experts on Florida lake law have commented that ". . . the concept of riparian rights accruing to an individual by ownership
of the land abutting on a navigable lake has no applicability to the nonnavigable lake,"
indicating that bed ownership is requisite in Florida to riparian rights on nonnavigable
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in the ordinary case in which the upland owner will own a portion of
the bed as well.
It is difficult to generalize about the nature of riparian rights, 28 since
they are established by highly diverse local law which each state determines for itself.29 Riparian rights have been described as "vested
property interests,"3 and they include at least the rights to use water
for irrigation, consumption, fishing, boating, hunting, swimming and
similar domestic and recreational uses. 1 Additionally, in the "common
use" jurisdictions (with which we are primarily concerned), these
riparian rights may be exercised over the entire surface of the nonnavigable lake, not just in waters overlying one's own bed as is the
case in the eastern jurisdictions mentioned above. 2
The "common use," or civil law, rule3 is enjoying increasing acceptance; to date it has been adopted in Michigan,3 4 Minnesota,3 5
Missouri, 6 Arkansas,3 7 Washington," Florida, 9 Mississippi,4" and, as
lakes. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U. FLA. L.
Rv.1, 68 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Maloney & Plager].
'sThe word "riparian" carries no magical meaning. It is merely a shorthand way of
describing those rights which the law recognizes as being held by the owner of land
adjacent to water.
'See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1891).
'See, e.g., Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 579, 445 P.2d 648, 651 (1968); In re
Clinton Water District, 36 Wn. 2d 284, 287, 218 P.2d 309, 312 (1950); Bino v. City of
Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571, 575 (1956); Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536,
15 N.W.2d 174, 179 (1944).
"1Such a listing fairly comports with the uses alluded to in the leading riparian right
of common use cases of Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 579, 445 P.2d 648, 651 (1968),
and Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 696-97 (1960). Contrast Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Commission, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712, 715-16
(1949) which, although generally recognizing the above uses, specifically rejected muskrat
trapping as an incident of the public right of navigation, calling it instead an "incident
of land use." To the rights listed in the text should be added the right to access to the
water
and construction of a dock to facilitate that access.
"2 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
For general discussion of the rule of common use consult Comment, Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52 CALF. L. Rav. 171 (1964); Johnson & Austin,
supra note 6, at 41-52; Note, Extent of Private Rights in Non-navigable Lakes, 5 U.
FLA. L. REV. 166, 176-78 (1952).
' Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487, 489 (1919); Burt v. Munger, 314
Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117, 120 (1946).
'Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 696-97 (1960).
'Missouri is included as a common use jurisdiction not on the basis of a specific
holding as to a nonnavigable lake, but rather on the strength of several closely analagous
opinions. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) (nonnavigable stream);
Greisinger v. Klinhart, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978, 983 (1928); Mueller v. Klinhart.
167 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (latter cases dealt with an artificial lake). See also
Luesse v. Weber, 350 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Sneed v. Weber, 307 S.W.2d
6817 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
" Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129, 134 (1955) (by implication).
'Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 821-22, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019, 57 A.L.R.2d 560
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to unsurveyed lake beds, in Virginia4 ' and possibly Texas. 42 Some
jurisdictions have achieved similar results by recognizing a public easement of navigation and recreation over nonnavigable waters, despite
private ownership of the bed.' Still other states, as we read their
existing case law, might well adopt the common use rule if the issue
arose.

44

Some of these "common use" states have also extended full surface
use rights to members of the general public who are able to gain access
to the water without trespass.4 5 Making the public surface use right
(1956); Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1968). Cf. Griffith
v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 P. 239 (1900) permitting fencing of unmeandered stream.
'Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
"State Game and Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940).
The case affirmed an injunction against the user, by reason of equal division as to statutory authority, but a majority of the court voted for a right of common use.
"In Improved Realty Co. v. Sowers, 195 Va. 317, 78 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1953), Virginia
adopted the rule of common use without apparent exception, but later in Wickouski v.
Swift, 203 Va. 467, 124 S.E.2d 892, 894-95 (1962) the Virginia court held the rule inapplicable to a nonnavigable fishing pond, the bed of which was divided by distinguishable boundary lines as opposed to the unsurveyed bed in Improved Realty, supra.
Washington explicitly rejected such a distinction in Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn. 2d 619,
622, 304 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1956). See also Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d
23 (1955) in which the bed owner was held to have an exclusive right of fishery in the
waters of a nonnavigable stream overlying his bed.
"In Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammet, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), the court
ruled that when bed ownership is based on surveyed boundaries, the bed owner has an
exclusive right of use of the overlying water, but indicated in dictum that common use
might apply when bed ownership was based solely on upland ownership without surveyed boundaries. Id. at 130.
"In both Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961) (nonnavigable stream)
and State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley, 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421
(1945) (lake formed by damming of navigable river), this public right of navigation
with incidental recreational rights, such as boating and fishing, was grounded in part on
a state constitutional declaration of public ownership of waters. Missouri can also be
placed in the public easement of navigation category by virtue of Elder v. Delcour,
364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) (nonnavigable stream). Oklahoma has just recently
declared such a public easement on a nonnavigable stream. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933,
935-36 (Okla. 1969).
"'Oregon has indicated its preference for a rule of common use by dictum in Luscher
v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936).
California affords some right of public use of waters overlying private beds. Compare
Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951) and Forrestier v. Johnson,
164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912) with Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532
(1907). The conclusion of one California commentator was that ". . . in addition to
being boatable it would seem that a body of water must be useful as a public passage
for a public right of navigation to exist . .. .?I Comment, Water Recreation-Pblic Use
of "Private Waters, 52 CApr. L. REv. 171, 180 (1964).
An early Idaho decision also permitted use of waters overlying a private stream bed.
Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 P. 499 (1908) (navigable stream, but bed held to
be privately-owned under state title test).
"Examples are Minnesota, which recognizes a public right of use as to all lakes
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coextensive with the riparian right, however, is not critical to our
analysis; for so long as someone, whether he be a member of the
public or a riparian, has a right to use the surface of a nonnavigable
lake over privately-owned beds, the conflict that we wish to examine
is present.
In any common use jurisdiction, the right of the riparian and/or
the public to use a lake's entire surface for boating, fishing, and
swimming, etc., is necessarily in conflict with any unrestrained right
in the bed owner to fill or build on his submerged property. Wherever
the riparian can literally use the entire lake surface, any fill or structure at all would violate his right. On the other hand, if each bed
owner can fill and build without restriction, the lake surface could
be consumed and recreational use could become impractical, if not
impossible. No doubt the easiest way to dispose of such a conflict
would be to permit one or the other of these competing users an exclusive right to use the lake surface. This is exactly what has been done
in the "eastern" (common law) rule states and in some of the arid
Western States,4 6 where the bed owner has the exclusive right. On the
other hand, the public is given a generally exclusive preference in the
"Great Pond" states and in "trust" states (such as Wisconsin),
where private ownership of lake beds is not ordinarily permitted. From
the outset, however, we have rejected such all-or-nothing answers;
instead, we seek a rule of reconciliation. Given our choice, the language of Judge O'Brien in Hedges v. West Shore Railroad Co. is most
apt:

48

capable of "substantial beneficial use"-at least when the state as riparian provides access-Flynn v. Beisel, 257 Minn. 531, 102 N.W.2d 284, 290-91 (1960), Bartlett v. Stalker
Lake Sportsmen's Club, - Minn. -, 168 N.W.2d 356, 360 (1969); and State v. Kuluvar,
266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699, 706 (1963) (dictum), and Michigan, which permits
public use of all "boatable" lakes, Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748, 752
(1957):
So long as boatable waters stand or flow in the upper reaches of this inland lake
people having lawful access to such waters may boat upon and fish in the same
provided they trespass not on fast and privately held lands. (emphasis added.)
Collins v. Gehrhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 49, 211 N.W. 115, 118 (1925) (stream). Those jurisdictions which recognize a public easement of navigation over privately-owned beds may
also be included in this category. See note 43 supra. Note also the California decisions
listed in note 44 supra.
"See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
' It must be noted that both in the Great Pond states and in Wisconsin, some filling
and building by the upland owner is permitted, despite public ownership of the lake
beds. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
's150 N.Y. 150, 44 N.E. 691, 693 (1896). The case involved a riparians' complaint that
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Where two such rights or interests exist, with respect to the same portion
of the earth's surface, each must be exercised and enjoyed in a reasonable
way. Each right or interest in such a case is always subject to the qualification that it cannot be exercised or enjoyed in such a way as -to destroy.
the other.

Only two courts have expressly discussed this conflict between lake
fills and buildings and riparian recreational rights; these two decisions
are Back v. Sarich,4 9 and a 1946 Michigan case, Burt v. Munger5 In
such a refreshing absence of fixed thinking, we have been able to perceive two judicial mechanisms which seem well-adapted to resolution
of disputes of this kind: (1) the test of "reasonable use," developed
under the riparian rights doctrine; and (2) the riparian-versus-nonriparian use test applied by the Washington Supreme Court in Bach

v. Sarich (also referred to as the "water-related" use test).
A.

The Reasonableness Test as Stated in the RiparianRights Doctrine

The riparian rights principle has been adopted to some extent in
nearly all the states of the nation (excluding those states in the arid
West which rely exclusively on the appropriation system: Montana,

Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico).
Although the riparian states vary considerably in their application of

the doctrine of riparian rights, a majority adhere to a "reasonable use"
rule in determining priorities among competing users. 1 "Reasonableness" has long been employed as a limitation on the exercise of rights
to consumptive uses,5 and has been adopted more recently as a restriction on recreational uses as well." But it has never been explicitly
their right of access to a navigable river had been unlawfully interfered with by the railroad company's bridge. The court, however, held otherwise.
974 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968). Discussed in text accompanying notes 14-18
supra and 65-67 infra.
LO314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946). This case involved fills only. See discussion
in text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
c 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs § 51.3 (R. Clark ed. 1967). A minority purport to
follow a natural flow theory. Id. For a discussion of Washington law in general (in
which incidentally the authors suggest that the natural flow theory is no longer the law
anywhere, and has not been since water requirements outran water supply) see Corker
& Roe, Washington's New Water Rights Law, 44 WASH. L. REv. 85 (1968).
'See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Lake Gibson Land
Co. v. Lester, 102 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (cases involving conflicts between
a riparian desiring to draw out water for irrigation and a riparian protesting that the
lowering of the water level interfered with recreational uses).
'See, e.g., Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake Commuex rel. Epperson, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (cases involving conflicts among
riparian recreational users and their licensees).
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applied to either authorize or prohibit fill or structural use of a nonnavigable lake.
No single analytical approach is apparent in the opinions which
apply the "reasonable use" test. It is generally agreed, however, that
the reasonableness of a particular use is a question of fact, which
depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. The Restatement of Torts § 852 (1939), in its treatment of consumptive uses,
recommends balancing the "utility of the use" against the "gravity
of the harm." 54 In Thompson v. Enz, 55 a recent case involving both
recreational and appropriative uses, the Supreme Court of Michigan
outlined a three step procedure to be followed when determining the
"reasonableness" of a proposed use: first, ascertain the nature of the
lake; second, assess the character and degree of the use itself; and
third, evaluate the consequential effects, including benefits and detriments, on the interests of other riparians and those of the state as
trustee for the general public. 6 Under either of these approaches, all
relevant factors must be considered; for example, in the case of a
fill or a building, the court would have to consider how far the development extends into the water, how much area of the lake is covered, what uses will be made of the fill or structure, what effects it
will have on fish life, boating, and the view of other riparians, etc.
A building or fill which encompasses so much of the lake surface area
as to render recreational use impractical would clearly be unreasonable; 57 similarly unreasonable would be a fence preventing access to
the waters overlying a significant portion of the bed.5" But, on the
other hand, an assertion of a right to boat or swim over literally the
entire lake surface, so no fill or building could be constructed, would

51RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 853, 854 (1939) lists various factors to be considered in
evaluating the "utility of the use" and the "gravity of the harm" respectively.
'379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473, 484-85 (1967).
'
Assumedly, the interests of the state as trustee for the public would not have to be
weighed in a jurisdiction which, unlike Michigan, has not recognized a public right to
use nonnavigable lake surfaces in common with riparians.
5-As previously mentioned, no case has arisen in which a fill or a building has been
held unreasonable, but analogously a fence was ordered to be removed as unreasonable
in Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958), and draining a lake so as to interfere with recreational uses has been enjoined
as unreasonable, Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W.2d 174, 182-83 (1944),
and cases cited in note 52 supra.
'
See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So. 2d 148 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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also be unreasonable. Between these extremes, "reasonableness" will
I
case.
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each
Since, between obvious polar cases, a given use cannot be assuredly
reasonable or unreasonable until litigation has resolved the issue, the
application of a test of "reasonableness" sacrifices much of the certainty and predictability 59 which prevails under the "exclusive rights"
solutions of some states. Yet, the overriding virtue of the "reasonableness" test is its capacity for full consideration of competing interests
and uses, disregarding rigid preferences and permitting a pragmatic
assessment of the most desirable water uses.
A critical point is that under the "reasonable use" test, no type of
us--not even a non-riparian use-is necessarily unreasonable per se. 0
Most "common use" cases speak solely in terms of reasonableness,
giving no indication that some specific type of use might be per se
unreasonable.6 Thus, under the "reasonable use" test, a non-riparian
use, such as an apartment building, could be considered reasonable;
but note that under the "riparian use" test of Back v. Sarich,6" an
apartment building which extends only a few feet over the lake surface
would be enjoinable as a non-riparian use. It must be pointed out,
however, that these "reasonableness" common use cases involved
clearly riparian uses such as boating and fishing, rather than possibly
non-riparian uses such as structures or fills, thus rendering an interpretation of their rationale as strictly one of "reasonableness" conjectural at best.'
"See

RESTATEmENT Or To~a's, ch. 41, Topic 3, Scope Note, at 345-46 (1939).
'The non-riparian character of the use, however, would be a factor in the analysis, one
weighing against a determination of reasonableness. RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 855 and
comment a (1939). Even as to consumptive uses, some states adhering to the "reasonable-

ness" test had crystalized the doctrine into one heavily preferring riparian over nonriparian uses. Id., comment b.

"See, e.g., Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 697 (1960):
...provided such is reasonable and does not unduly interfere with the exercise of

similar rights on the part of abutting owners.

Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 794 (Fla. 1959):

.. a body of water should be available to all owners for use that would not

unreasonably interfere with rights of other proprietors.
Florida commentators on Duval, supra, have interpreted the case as adopting a rule of
reasonableness. F. MALoNEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDwIN, WATER LAW . AND NISTRATiON
-TNE FLORIDA EIxPaIERNcE § 23.1, at 52-54 (1968). Both cases involved blocking of
riparian access by bed owners' fences.
74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968). Discussed in text accompanying notes 14-18

supra and notes 65 et seq. infra.
'That these cases did not involve structural or fill uses might be crucial. Both cases
which did face structural or fill uses, Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968),
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The test of "reasonableness" can justly mediate conflicts between
a bed owner's property right and a riparian right of common use. The
bed titleholder may fill and build so long as he does not unreasonably
interfere with the riparian rights of recreational use. The riparians
are assured of a reasonable scope for their right of recreational use,
albeit not over every inch of lake surface. In short, both rights are
preserved and each is exercisable to a reasonable extent.64
B. The Riparian-Non-RiparianUse Test
The categorical test applied by the Washington Supreme Court in
Back v. Sarich,6" as previously noted, distinguishes between riparian
and non-riparian structural uses and fills. But the riparian-ness of a
use does not necessarily follow from the fact that the use is performed
by a riparian owner, in a riparian location, or under a claim of authority arising out of riparian rights; instead, the Washington Supreme
Court put forth an unique definition: 66
Mere proximity of the apartment does not render it a riparian use. With
respect to a structure, such a use must be so intimately associated with
the water that apart from the water its utility would be seriously impaired.
The court thus first tests the use for "intimate association with the
water" in order to ascertain its status as riparian vel non. If the use
and Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946), employed a type of use
approach (certainly so in Bach, arguably so in Burt). See notes 65-73 and accompanying
text infra. Bach's adoption of a riparianness test is especially interesting on this point,
for Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 822, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956), in which the rule
of common use was adopted in Washington, had spoken solely in terms of reasonableness:
[the riparian] may use the entire surface of the lake so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the exercise of similar rights by the other owners.
Yet Bach swerved from the straight reasonableness analysis, lending credence to a prediction that other common use courts might follow suit when faced with a structural
or fill use.
The reasonableness test might also apply in those jurisdictions which arrive at common use via declaration of a public right of navigation, rather than through riparian
rights concepts. It could, for example, be applied in Wyoming where the court in Day
v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) recognized such a public right of use in all
waters of the state. This right is based on an easement theory: the title to the waters is
in the state; the state necessarily has an easement over private lands for the flow of its
waters; thus, the waters, not being in trespass over the lands, are available for public
use. It could be argued that a lakebed owner could only make a reasonable use of his
portion of the bed, otherwise he would be interfering with the state's and the public's
easement. Conceivably reasonableness here might be construed to mean water-relatedness,
also. A similar argument could be made as to Missouri (Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,
269 S.W.2d 17 (1954)) and other states that adhere to the public right of navigation
approach. See note 43 supra.
74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
"Id. at 579, 445 P.2d at 651.
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is determined to be non-riparian, then it is unlawful, even if it is in fact
reasonable. If the use is ruled riparian, however, the test of "reasonableness" must still be fulfilled before the court will conclude that
the use is permissible. This additional examination for reasonableness
seems to be plainly required by earlier Washington decisions dealing
with recreational uses which held that a riparian use must be reasonableY7 Thus, in Washington, a structural use or fill must be both
riparian and reasonable in order to be lawful. Any non-riparian use
which occupies even a minute portion of a nonnavigable lake surface
should be illegal under the strict logic of the Bach opinion.
Bach is a unique decision. The only case closely resembling it is
Burt v. Munger, 8 a 1946 declaratory judgment action in which the
Michigan Supreme Court denied a riparian bed owner the right to
make two dirt fills on the bed of a nonnavigable lake. One fill was
designed to prevent erosion, the other to increase the size of the
upland.
Bach and Burt both relied on earlier "common use" decisions in
their respective jurisdictions holding that "[e]ach riparian owner has
the right to fish in any part of the lake,' 69 and that "[a]ll riparian
owners along the shore of a natural, nonnavigable lake share in common the right to use the entire surface of the lake for boating, swimming, fishing, and other similar riparian rights so long as there is no
unreasonable interference with the exercise of these rights by other
respective owners."" In both cases, the courts ruled that the structure
and the fills, respectively, constituted an impermissible interference
with the common rights of recreational use belonging to other riparians.
Bach explicitly based its decision on the non-riparian nature of the
OBotton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake Community Club
v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966) (per curiam). In these cases unregulated
access of state licensees (entering through a Game Department road) was enjoined as
unreasonable on the petition of riparian owners. The cases are discussed in Note, The
Tak of Two Lakes-A New Chapter in Washington Water Law, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 475
(1967).
In Bach, however, the court was not required to proceed to a reasonableness examination, given its initial determination that the apartment was not a riparian use.
314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946).
Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117, 119 (1946), quoting Bauman v.
Barendregt, 251 Mich. 67, 231 N.W. 70, 71 (1930). The rule of common use was first
adopted in Michigan in Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919)-the forerunner of the modem common use cases in other jurisdictions.
'Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1968), citing Snively v.
Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), and Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420
P.2d 352 (1966).
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apartment building. Burt is unclear on this point, but the fact that the
court there denied the bed owner permission to construct a retaining
wall only a few feet off shore seems to indicate that the court was
applying something more than a simple "reasonable use" test.7 ' Moreover, language in the Burt opinion is consistent with the Back "riparian
use" test:

72

[W] e are not unmindful of the general rule that a riparian proprietor may
construct a dock, wharf, or pier for the purpose of facilitating his use and
enjoyment of the waters of the lake. [citation omitted] In the case at bar,

however, such is not the purpose of either the proposed wall or the filling
in of the submerged land. (Emphasis added.)
The court's reference to wharves and docks indicates approval of
obviously riparian or "water-related" structures, and the emphasis on
the "purpose" seems to establish a condition which would exclude
non-riparian uses. It is thus possible to conclude that both Burt and
Back have adopted a "riparian use" test as a supplement to the test of
"reasonableness. 73
As we have previously mentioned 7 4 the common use decisions from
other jurisdictions dealing with recreational uses exhibit no reliance on
riparian-ness. Yet, the fence cases, 75 involving attempts by the bed
'The same Florida commentators who interpreted Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791
(Fla. 1959), as adopting the test of reasonableness (see note 61 supra), interpreted the
order to remove the retaining wall to mean that Burt was "contrary to the reasonable
use rule." F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDwIN, supra note 61, at 54. A Florida case
holds that a retaining wall is permissable if on upland. Hill v. McDuffie, 196 So. 2d 790
(Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"2 Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d at 120.
"A recent opinion of a Michigan intermediate appellate court has language at least
contrary in spirit to an interpretation of Burt as adhering to a strict riparian use theory.
Inter alia the court spoke of failure of proof that the fill "will substantially affect the
total surface area of the lake for boating and swimming." Henson v. Gerloffs, 13 Mich.
App. 435, 164 N.W.2d 533, 539 (1969) (emphasis supplied). The language was dictum,
however, for the fill at issue was apparently on upland. In any event the language does
not bind the Michigan Supreme Court, which rendered Burt.
7'See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
'The main common use fence decisions, including some cases involving obstructions
other than by fencing, are: Michigan-Rice v. Naimish, 8 Mich. App. 698, 155 N.W.2d
370 (1968); Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957); Manney v. Prouse,
248 Mich. 654, 227 N.W. 685 (1929); Collins v. Gearhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115
(1926). See also Ruggles v. Dandison, 284 Mich. 338, 279 N.W. 851 (1938). MinnesotaJohnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960). Missouri-Elder v. Delcour,
364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Greisinger v. Klinhart, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d
978 (1928); Mueller v. Klinhart, 167 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943); Sneed v. Weber,
307 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Luesse v. Weber, 350 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961). (All save Delcour involved artificial lakes. In the Klinhart cases the obstruction
was enjoined, but in the Weber cases the injunction was denied.) Florida-Duval v.
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owner to fence out other riparians or the general public, are at least
consistent with the tests for reasonableness or riparian-ness. In each of
these cases, "common use" courts have hastened to enjoin construction
of such fences, but the facts in each case are adaptable to a decision
based on either the unreasonableness of the fence or its non-riparian
nature. 6 For example, in Rice v. Naimish,77 a recent Michigan opinion,
the plaintiff was a riparian who owned two upland parcels situated on
each side of the defendant's tract. Plaintiff also held title to a portion
of the bed of the nonnavigable lake on which the upland.parcels
abutted. The conflict arose when plaintiff erected a fence across the
lake on his bed to connect his separated upland parcels. Defendant,
whose deep water access was thus obstructed, tore down the fence. The
court held that the defendant was privileged to remove the fence since
it impeded his right of common use. Within the "reasonableness" context, the facts clearly illustrate the great harm to the defendant resulting from total loss of his rights of recreational use, as compared to the
slight benefit to the plaintiff-which indicates that the fence was
clearly unreasonable-and the court did utilize the term "unreasonably" (but rather casually). On the other hand, it is also obvious that
the fence did not serve any riparian purpose of the plaintiff, and could
have been enjoined on the non-riparian use rationale, since it merely
connected two upland tracts, and was evidently primarily intended to
prevent defendant's use of the lake. Bach and Burt are thus the only
two cases which can reasonably be interpreted as actually applying the
"riparian use" test.
The approach of Bach (and, arguably, of Burt) is to reconcile conflicts between surface users and bed owners by resort not only to the
traditional test of "reasonableness," but also by a preliminary inquiry
as to the riparian character vel non of each particular use by the bed
Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959), affg 107 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Conrad v. Whitney, 141 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Virginia-Wickouski v.
Swift, 203 Va. 467, 124 S.E.2d 892 (1962) (permissible when bed surveyed). TexasTaylor Fishing Club v. Hammet, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (permissible
when bed surveyed). Compare the Wisconsin cases which present special considerations
due to public ownership of lake beds. See, e.g., Baker v. Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W.
413 (1935); Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965) (artificial lake).
,' There are occasional exceptions. For example, the Florida intermediate appellate court,
in Duval v. Thomas, 107 So. 2d 148, 151-53, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) affd 114 So. 2d
791 (Fla. 1959), used an extensive analysis of the reasonable use theory on which to base
its ruling against the fence owner.
18 Mich. App. 698, 155 N.W.2d 370 (1968).
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owner. On its merits, this riparian-ness or "water-related" use test is
certainly justifiable. The rights of recreational users are thereby protected by allowing only those structural and fill uses which are natural
and appropriate at a riparian location. Furthermore, even a "waterrelated" use (e.g., a dock) will not be permitted to so unreasonably
consume the lake surface so as to render boating or fishing impossible
or impractical, for the limit of "reasonableness" is undisturbed. But
the bed owner does retain an exclusive right to build docks7" boathouses, rafts7 9 and other "water-related" structures" on his bed, and
to fill thereon in order to facilitate such construction. In addition,
ownership of a portion of the bed gives rise to other exclusive rights
such as permanent anchorage,8 1 trapping, 2 walking on the bed (possibly),"' and still others. 4 Of course, all such uses must still be reason-

'See, e.g., Fames v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 161 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1968); Blain v.
Craigie, 294 Mich. 545, 293 N.W. 745 (1940) (sub silentio).
"See Swartz v. Sherston, 299 Mich. 423, 300 N.W. 148 (1941) (which prohibited a
neighboring riparian from anchoring a swimming dock and slide on the bed owner's
bed, implying that the bed owner has an exclusive right as regards such uses); Hall v.
Wantz, 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 462 (1953).
"' The exact nature of a "water-related" use is not easy to envision. Even an apartment
such as in Bach could arguably be classified as water-related if the lake location was an
intimate part of the apartment design. Such a conclusion seems unlikely, however. A
closer question is as to houseboats. One could argue that they had no use at all unless
floating on water, just as if a boat. On the other hand, one could argue that they are
just a house, without water-relation, and should be confined to the upland.
Another debatable use is a retaining wall built to protect upland from water erosion.
One could argue that such a wall is water-related, since its sole function is to protect
against the water. But in Burt a retaining wall built only a few feet from shore was held
impermissible. However, if the wall is on upland it is lawful. Hill v. McDuffle, 196 So. 2d
790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Barnes v. Marshall, 68 Cal. 569, 10 P. 115 (1886). A
retaining wall just a few feet from shore would probably be held reasonable, and given
the relation of its purpose to the water, it is arguably "water-related" under the Bach
test. However, as with all such questions of what fill or structures are permissible under
Bach, a final answer must await further litigation.
(member of the public
SSee Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 462 (1953)
prohibited from permanently anchoring a raft on privately-owned lake bed).
'See Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712,
715-16 (1949) in which trapping was held to be an incident of bed ownership and not
encompassed within the public right of surface navigation. The case involved a stream,
bed title under Wisconsin law being in private ownership unlike the case of lake beds.
See note 21 supra.
Compare Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146 (Wyo. 1961) (dictum that more than
incidental use of private stream bed by one exercising public easement of navigation is
a trespass) with Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17, 27 (1954) (fisherman
may walk down private stream bed in exercise of public right of navigation) and Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712, 716 (1949)
(dictum that bathers and fisherman exercising their public right of navigation may walk
on privately-owned stream bed).
,'Examples of other possible exclusive use rights of the bed owner are taking of ice,
Haase v. Kingston Co-operative Creamery Ass'n, 212 Wis. 585, 250 N.W. 444 (1933), and
taking of sand and gravel, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 218 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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able. 8 On balance, it is evident that the property rights of the bed
owner have not been confiscated, and that very substantial rights remain; any limitation of such property rights has been necessitated by
reason of their conflict with other rights of property,", that is, the
riparian right to common use of the lake surface for recreational
purposes.
It is arguable that Bach imposed an unnecessarily rigid and stringent
rule when it prohibited all non-riparian structural and fill uses on lake
surfaces, regardless of their reasonableness.8 7 Of course, with respect
to some lakes-perhaps most-there is obvious wisdom in allowing
only riparian structures and fill; but, just as obviously, this might be
unwise on other lakes. Considering the presence of several thousand
lakes in Washington, it might be desirable and entirely proper to
permit some filling and building on some of these lakes, for residences
and parks, for example, or even for industrial purposes on lakes which
are completely unsuitable for recreational use. The Washington Supreme Court, however, exhibiting an implicit preference for conservation of environmental quality, apparently concluded that the value of
our small lakes for scenery, open space, and recreation is so great that
they should be absolutely protected from invasion by non-riparian fills
and buildings. The court was probably concerned that a "reasonableness" test would be uncertain enough to allow aggressive developers to
forge ahead with fills and construction too rapidly to be effectively
controlled by court actions. An absolute prohibition of non-riparian
uses certainly reduces, and perhaps eliminates, this possibility. Moreover, given the intense demographic and geographic pressures on our
remaining open spaces, the Bach decision seems to state wise social
policy insofar as it provides a countervailing force in the lakes setting.
The Bach riparian-non-riparian use test also serves to diminish the
uncertainty of the traditional reasonableness test. But even under the

Cf. Morgan v. Koss, 244 Mich. 192, 221 N.W. 113 (1928) (bridge, entirely on private
bed, held interference with public right of surface use).
The riparian right of common use has been held one of property. See authorities cited
in note 30 supra.
I Under the Bach rule not even a state or municipality could fill or build for nonriparian purposes without paying compensation since otherwise a "taking" of riparian
property rights would result. A park fill might be considered riparian, however, given its
enhancement of lake access and view. See City of Madison v. State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83
N.W.2d 674, 678 (1957), where a civic center on navigable lake fill was held consistent
with the state's trusteeship over public waters, partly on view and access considerations.
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new classifications, a measure of uncertainty remains, i.e. as to whether
or not a use is riparian. Furthermore, the rigidity of this new rule
sacrifices flexibility of analysis, and relinquishes all opportunity to discriminate among our diverse nonnavigable lakes. Ultimately, to decide
whether the riparian-ness or the reasonableness test is the better device
for dealing with conflicts between bed owners and surface users will
require realistic assessment of the weight desirable to attach to the
conservationist goal of small lake preservation. If a high value is
ascribed to that goal, then clearly preferable is Back's test of riparianness, which is stricter and prohibits more uses. If, on the other hand,
less weight is attached to the conservationist goals, then the test of
"reasonableness" is the more likely selection, for it possesses greater
flexibility and pays greater deference to the property rights of bed
owners. The question is essentially one of policy, which may vary in
different regional settings.
C. A Postscript on the "Private" Lake
In the preceding sections, we have emphasized the available mechanisms for resolution of the conflict, in the common use jurisdictions,
between the bed owner's use of his bed for fill and construction and the
riparian owner's common right of recreational use. Although we have
alluded to the public policy in favor of preserving small lakes for open
space, scenic views, and recreation, this policy has not heretofore been
essential to our analysis, since some limitation of fills and structural
uses is required independently of any public policy considerations by
the simple necessity to resolve the bed-surface use conflict. However,
when a nonnavigable lake bed and all the surrounding upland is owned
by one individual, or when all bed and surrounding upland owners are
in agreement on the development of the lake, there is no bed-surface
use conflict. Should there not be some public policy interest in preserving the lake surface from unreasonable or non-riparian construction thereon?
Suppose, for example, that the owner or owners propose to erect a
large structure, necessitating much fill (such as a small manufacturing
plant), over a nonnavigable lake surface; and further suppose that the
building would be adjudged clearly non-riparian and unreasonable if
its construction were to be challenged by one of the participating
riparians, but that it does not constitute a public or private nuisance.
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Now public policy considerations become paramount, since the need
for use-reconciliation does not exist. We believe that it is a critical
question whether a public policy of preserving small lakes should require application of the reasonableness or riparian-ness tests in a situation where there is no underlying necessity to reconcile conflicting bed
and surface uses; but we do not presume to answer this question, believing it to be outside the scope of our present inquiry and more appropriately resolved by reference to particular local conditions. Nonetheless, we will briefly examine the question of whether the concepts of
reasonableness and/or riparian-ness do now apply to such situations;
in short, under present authorities, is there such a thing as a "private"
lake?
The answer must be yes, but somewhat qualified. In those jurisdictions which do not recognize any right in the general public to use
nonnavigable lake surfaces, there is no apparent basis upon which construction or nonnavigable lake beds by agreement of all upland and bed
owners could be prevented."8 In Bach the order to remove the apartment building was justified solely on the ground of interference with
common rights of use by other riparians.8 9 But where all riparians have
surrendered these rights respecting that portion of the bed over which
the structure is planned, no such interference would exist, and protections of riparians would not justify an injunction. The test of "reasonableness," being also theoretically dependent upon interference with
rights of other riparians, would likewise be inapplicable." Thus, where
the right of common use is recognized only in riparians and not in the
public generally, we envision no judicial obstacle to fills or structural
uses by agreement of all riparians and bed owners.
In a jurisdiction which does recognize public rights of common use,
however, the answer is not so certain. Where public access to the lake
In a jurisdiction such as Florida which attaches riparian rights only to bed ownership,
consent of upland owners would not be necessary, but only that of bed owners. See note
27 supra.
74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1968).
"See RESTATEIMNT op TORTS §§ 851-54 (1939).
Florida commentators have concluded that in Florida (where the rule of reasonableness
was adhered to in Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So. 2d 148
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958))
i]f the bed of a non-navigable lake is entirely owned by one individual, he apparently can use the lake as he would any other piece of realty, including filling
it in and building on it.
Maloney & Plager, supra note 27, at 67-68.
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is available, erection of a structure over the water would obviously
infringe these rights; conversely, however, where there is no such
access, it does not necessarily follow that there is no legal impediment
to the construction." Perhaps the potentiality of future public access
should be sufficient to justify application of judicial limitations, but the
possibility that one riparian may grant access in the future is probably
not enough.2 The probability that such a private grant would ever
occur is highly conjectural, and even if such a grant were made, it is
likely that it would be subject to the riparian's earlier consent to the
structure. If, however, the state has the authority to condemn access
routes to nonnavigable lakes, rendering the public expectancy in surface use rights more substantial, judicial restraints on bed uses could
probably be justified, especially in those jurisdictions where the state
power of condemnation is exercisable with respect to lakes which are
entirely situated on the property of one individual. 3 While the exercise
of the power would still be conjectural, nevertheless, application of
judicial limitations prior to any actual access condemnation could be
rationalized on the basis of the reasonable apprehension that the rapid
pace of development might consume all available nonnavigable lakes
suitable for recreational use before access rights could be acquired,
thus frustrating the policy underlying the access condemnation statutes 4 But the doctrinal legitimacy of so "reserving" all nonnavigable
"private" lakes on the chance that public access might be condemned
at some future time seems questionable. Thus, we doubt that judicial
"' Even in a public use jurisdiction, the public may not trespass to obtain access to the
lake. See, e.g., Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957), quoted note 45
supra; Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393 (1923).
" Cases have held that access rights may be granted to the public by one riparian over
protests of other riparians. E.g., Bartlett v. Stalker Lake Sportsmen's Club, Minn.
-,
168 N.W.2d 356 (1969); Flynn v. Beisel, 257 Minn. 531, 102 N.W.2d 284 (1960).
If the conduct of the public is unreasonable, however, access may be enjoined. E.g.,
Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake Community Club v.
State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966) (per curiam), noted in 43 WASH. L. REv. 475
(1967).
'As to condemnation of access to a lake wholly on the land of one person compare
Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W.2d 105 (1961) (condemnation permitted) with State, by Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954)
and Osceola County v. Triple E Dev. Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956) (prohibiting condemnation).
"Analogously, however, legislative attempts to prohibit building in strips scheduled
for eventual street right of way condemnation has not always received judicial favor.
Cf. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
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rules alone can do very much, if anything at all, to preserve nonnavigable lakes from structural obliteration by sole owners or by concurring bed and riparian owners.
In our opinion either the "reasonable use" test or the "riparian-nonriparian" test can perform very satisfactorily as a mechanism for resolving disputes between bed owners and surface users. The riparian
use rule also serves a conservationist goal of lake preservation insofar
as it permits a dissenting riparian (and, possibly a member of the
public) to prevent use of lakebeds for non-riparian fills or structures;
the test of reasonableness is less vigorous in this regard. Neither rule,
however, promises to be effective at protecting lakes from invasions by
sole owners or concurring bed and riparian owners who decide to fill
and build, because these judicial rules depend for their applicability
upon some interference with riparian rights, which does not exist as to
consenting riparians. Each of these rules also possesses the disadvantage of some uncertainty; only occasionally will a bed owner be able
to definitely ascertain whether his structure or fill is "reasonable" or
"riparian", short of judicial approval. But all of these problems remind
us of those which plagued the "nuisance test" for resolving dry land
use conflicts some years ago. In that situation, when the problems became too complex for the judicial machinery, there was a movement
toward control through enactment of zoning laws and regulations. We
suggest that a similar zoning solution would be an appropriate means
for improvement and supplementation of the present management of
lake use conflicts by judicial limitations. Zoning would permit particularized regulation of all lakes (even those which are privately owned),
without the necessity of reliance on a riparian plaintiff, and could serve
as the vehicle for expression of public water policy respecting our small
lakes.
II. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION AND BEYOND
A. Zoning
The usefulness of zoning in the context of small lake filling and
building seems obvious to us; yet, insofar as we have been able to
ascertain, zoning has never been purposefully applied in order to reg-
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ulate bed and surface uses of nonnavigable lakes.95 The Bach case
illustrates what we believe to be a general small lake situation: the bed
of nonnavigable Bitter Lake had been classified on a zoning map to
permit apartments; yet there was no evidence that the zoning body,
the Seattle City Council, had ever given any special consideration
to the fact that the zone area encompassed a lake bed. 96 Not surprisingly, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the zoning contention in Back, stating that it was "certain" that the authorization of
apartment uses on the lake bed was "not intended by the Seattle zoning
authorities."9
I By "purposefully" we mean to emphasize an effort to regulate lake bed uses specially
as distinct from general land use controls.
In the summer and fall of 1968, we communicated with planning officials and legal
officers in various West and Mid-West counties and municipalities which were characterized by large population concentrations and the presence of small lakes. Cities contacted included Denver, Oklahoma City, Wichita, Kansas City, St. Louis, Minneapolis,
St. Paul, Des Moines, Milwaukee, Grand Rapids, and Seattle. Response was excellent,
but, at least as of that time, no locality had embarked on a program of small lake
zoning. Several cities, however, for example Minneapolis and St. Louis, had achieved the
ultimate control solution-public ownership for park purposes of all or many of the
small lakes within their boundaries.
General zoning regulations, however, have been extended to navigable waters filling and
building. (See cases cited in note 108 infra.) Some water structures have been specifically
regulated. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.12.040(k) (1968) (moorages for private
pleasure craft). More frequently upland zoning is simply extended to adjacent water
areas. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.08.030(a) (1968) (which, in the absence of
harbor lines, extends the upland zone boundary 500 feet out from the natural shore line
of a navigable water body) ; and Ponelait v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954)
(case upholding ordinance extending upland zoning to fill in navigable waters). One court
has construed a zoning ordinance which restricted "land" uses to apply to "land" underlying tidal waters. Wynn v. Margate City, 9 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 A. 565 (1931) (per
curiam). Some special waterfront zones are also to be found, but these zones are often
designed just to authorize special types of water uses (such as marinas) in certain areas,
without purporting to comprehensively regulate the use of lake beds. See, e.g., SEArrL,
WASH., CODE ch. 26.18 (1968) (Residence Waterfront Zone). All of these regulations,
however, are directed at navigable water bed uses.
We know of no "purposeful" zoning control of common use nonnavigable lakes, which
aims at reconciliation of the bed-surface use conflict or promotion of a public policy of
small lake preservation. Minnesota does control structural and fill uses to some extent
under a permit system. Anyone desiring ". . . in any manner . . . to change or diminish

the course, current or cross-section of any public water . . ." must first obtain a permit
from the state conservation commissioner. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42 (1964). "Public
waters" includes all lakes "capable of substantial beneficial public use." Id. § 105.38. The
definition apparently does encompass some nonnavigable lakes, but does not include
"private lakes," ones to which no public access is available. See State v. Kuluvar, 266
Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699, 705-06 (1963).
' Although zoning lines were extended over and through Bitter Lake, they were terminated close off shore in the case of Hailer Lake, another small nonnavigable lake in
Seattle, located just a few miles from Bitter Lake. Given total lack of any indication that
the city had intended to zone Bitter Lake, but not Hailer Lake, such inconsistency provides some evidence that the city draws or does not draw zoning lines with little or no
concern as to the existence of lakes.
' Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 652 (1968).
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It is somewhat surprising that zoning has not yet been consciously
applied to small lake fills and structures. Commentators have advocated
zoning of water surface uses."" Conflicts between builders and recreational users are increasingly frequent now, and should provide ample
incentive for adoption of administrative controls 0 We believe that the
number and variety of such conflicts will soon outstrip the capabilities of the judicial system, and that it would be far better to initiate
supplementary zoning regulations in anticipation now, rather than at
some later time under the force of necessity.
The states undoubtedly have the power to zone lake beds, just as
they do to zone dry land. If the bed owner's right of use is treated
strictly as a dry land property interest, then it would be permissible
to zone the lake bed under the authority of the long-settled constitutionality of dry land zoning.10 0 Even if the right of the bed owner to
fill and build is considered a riparian right (i.e., either per se in a state
like Washington which applies the riparian use test, or derivatively because regulation of it affects the exercise of riparian rights' 0 1), it is a
property right, 10 2 which may not be "taken," but may be "regulated"
under the state's police power. °3 Reasonable regulation of various
riparian rights has been upheld, 04 including regulation of wharves' 015
' Among them have been Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested
Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 542, 600-06 (1958) (Waite outlines a comprehensive statelocal zoning program); Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 Bu''Ano L. av.
427, 443-47 (1961) (primarily recreational as opposed to structural use zoning) Maloney
& Plager, supra note 27, at 64 (suggestion rather than advocation) ; Comment, Role of
Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 117, 135-41 (1959).
' In Washington State alone, in addition to the dispute on Bitter Lake leading to Bach,
conflicts as to water fills and buildings have arisen on the navigable waters of Lake
Chelan, Lake Union (Seattle), and Hood Canal (salt water). For a discussion of the
Lake Chelan dispute and the Washington Supreme Court opinion arising out of it,
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), see Corker, supra
note 8.
'VVillage
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
'For example, in one case it was argued that zoning prohibition of a boat livery on
navigable water fill was unlawful insofar as such regulation impeded the use of the sea
and navigable waters. The court treated the application of the zoning ordinance as a
regulation of riparian rights, but upheld the enactment as against the fill owner's contention, ruling that riparian rights, as well as dry land property rights, were subject to
reasonable zoning regulation. Ponelait v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479, 481 (1954).
'2 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
' California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555, 562 (9th
Cir. 1934), aff'd 295 U.S. 142 (1935); Note, The State *v. The Riparian: A Problem of
Water Use and Control, 1961 WASe. U.L.Q. 257, 269-71 (1961).
'For examples see Maloney & Plager, supra note 27, at 70-73; Note, The State v. Tle
Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and Control, 1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 257, 269-71; 1
WATERs =m WA=a RiGHTs § 53.5(E) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
'See, e.g., Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410 (1903).
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and fills.' Regulation by zoning has itself been upheld in situations
where it affects riparian rights, 10 7 but there is little direct authority on
the power of the state and local governments to zone lake bed fill and
building uses. 0 8 Significantly, zoning, unlike the judicial rules, 109 would
apply to the "private" lakes, those owned wholly by one individual or
by multiple owners in agreement on the development of the lake." 0
Even assuming a general power to zone lake beds, however, there
remains some question concerning the authority of localities under
present state enabling acts; thus, a statutory amendment might be
necessary in some instances."'
"°See,e.g., State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699, 706 (1963).
"o'Grosse Ile Township v. Dunbar and Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, 167
N.W.2d 311 (1969); Ponelait v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954); Raffale v.
Planning and Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 157 Conn. 454, 254 A.2d 868 (1969); Wynn v.
Margate City, 9 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 A. 565 (1931) (per curiam); Little v. Young, 82
N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1948) aff'd 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1948) (mem.),
aff'd 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74 (1949) (mem.); Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 64
F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn.), aff'd 156 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1946); Wicen v. Oconomowac
Fisherman's League, Circuit Court, Waukesha County, Wis., No. 9142, June, 1958 (this
case is discussed in Comment, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959 Wis. L.
REv. 117, 138-39 (1959)). Cf. Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn. 2d 358, 267 P.2d 691 (1954).
For a general discussion see Comment, Role of Local Government in Water Law, 1959
Wis. L. REv. 117, 135-41 (1959).
'In Ponelait v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479, 481 (1954), the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut upheld an ordinance extending upland zoning to fills and structures in previously unzoned waters. The case involved a 225 foot hill in navigable waters.
In Wynn v. Margate City, 9 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 A. 565 (1931) (per curiam) side lot
line restrictions applying to "land" were held applicable to land under water so as to
render a house on pilings over tidal waters in violation of the ordinance. In Grosse le
Township v. Dunbar and Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, 167 N.W.2d 311
(1969), a dike and fill operation in the navigable Detroit River was, as an alternative
holding, enjoined as a violation of a town zoning ordinance. All of these decisions concerned navigable waters, but there should be no difference in result as to nonnavigable
water bodies.
'o See notes 88-94 and accompanying text supra.
"1 Zoning has long been approved as a limitation on private property rights. Since a
bed owner can be in violation of a zoning ordinance despite lack of interference with
riparian rights, zoning, unlike the judicial limitations, would seem plainly applicable to
private waters.
"IFYA. STAT. ANN. § 176.02 (1966), which authorizes municipalities to "regulate and
restrict . . . the location and use of buildings, structures, and land and water for trade,
industry, residence or other purposes" is one zoning enabling act which specifically grants
local authority to zone water. Other state enabling acts typically do not mention water.
For example, WAsir. REV. CoDE § 35.63.080 (1965), authorizes cities to "regulate and
restrict the location and use of buildings, structures and land for residence, trade, industrial and other purposes . . . ." (This section does specifically refer to set-backs along
"public water frontages".) Zoning of bed fills and structures may be authorized by a
provision such as the Washington one, however. "Land" could be interpreted to refer to
land under water as well as upland. This approach was employed in Wynn v. Margate
City, 9 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 A. 565 (1931) (per curiam) (see note 108 supra). Alternatively, the provision could simply be construed to authorize regulation of "buildings"
and "structures" wherever located. Thus, an amendment might not need to be obtained
in Washington.
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In any event, the power to regulate fills and buildings on lake beds
is not without limit. For example, the state may not use such regulation
to confiscate private property without "just compensation."'1 2 Whether
a zoning regulation is "confiscatory" is generally determined by weighing the public interest in the enactment against the private loss of the
property owner."" To cause loss of some economic value alone is not
confiscatory, 4 but to zone an entire lake for open space, prohibiting
all fills and buildings, probably would be." 5 On the other hand, restriction of a lake bed to certain "water-related" uses, such as boathouses, docks, rafts, etc., would probably not be confiscatory, because
the property owner's loss of the opportunity to build non-riparian
structures would be outweighed by the public interest in preserving
small lakes." 6 But aside from the obvious cases, the exact limits imposed on the zoning power in the small lake setting by the concept of
((confiscation" can only be defined by litigation of particular fact
patterns.
The "just compensation" limitation applies generally to all zoning
of lake surfaces. Additionally, in the "common use" jurisdictions, no
governmental unit may authorize, by zoning, any fill or structural use
which is unreasonable, or non-riparian (where the Back rule applies),
since such uses are, despite their zoning classification, unlawful inter"'The "just compensation" requirement of the fifth amendment has been applied to
the states through incorporation within the meaning of "due process" under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). On
zoning in particular, see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Bach v.
Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968); 1 RATHKopp, THE LAW OF ZONIG AND
PLANNMG, ch. 6 (1965 as supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as RATirxops. A recurring issue
as to whether a "taking" has resulted in the riparian rights area arises when a city
attempts to prevent riparians from swimming or bathing in waters from which the public
drinking supply is obtained. The cases are divided on whether compensation is required.
Leading cases requiring compensation are Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d
571 (1956), 56 A.L.R.2d 778 (1957); and People v. Hurlburt, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211
(1902). A good short discussion is available in Note, Governmental Restriction of Water
Use, 1959 Wis. L. Rav. 341 (1959).
Note, Fishing and Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams, 53 IowA L. Rav.
1322, 1325-26 (1968); Note, The State v. The Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and
Control, 1961 WAsHr. U.L.Q. 257, 270-71 (1961).
u'1 RATnxoPi, supra note 112, at 6-5-6-6.
'Waite,
The Dilemma of Water Recreation and A Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L.
RnV. 542, 605 (1958), suggests that such open space zoning might be permissible if sufficient public necessity is shown. It can be argued, however, that total open space zoning,
being for general public benefit, should be paid for by the public through condemnation
proceedings rather than placed solely on the private individual whose use is restricted.
See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 650,
665, 666 (1958), as quoted in 1 RATnKOPF, supra note 112, at 6-7-6-10.
' In this case as opposed to total open space zoning, the property owner would retain
sufficient rights of use as to render a holding of confiscation improbable.
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ferences with the rights of riparians to use the lake surface for recreational purposes. The Back court was explicit on this point: 17
These rights [of common use] are vested property rights, and may not be
taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.
[citation omitted] It follows, therefore, that while the city of Seattle might
regulate the exercise of these rights by means of its police power, it may
not totally divest plaintiffs of them through the mechanisms of zoning. Indeed, the effect of this case, if we were to follow defendants' reasoning
would be to divest plaintiffs of valuable property rights for the private use
and benefit of defendants.
In these jurisdictions, then, the authorization of an unreasonable or
non-riparian use would result in a "taking" of the riparian right of
common use, while in a common law jurisdiction, where no such riparian
right is recognized, authorization of the same use would not result in
any "taking." Thus, the judicial rules of reasonableness and riparianness limit legislative power as well as the bed owners' liberty as to filling and building over nonnavigable lake surfaces.
Exercise of the zoning power over the beds of nonnavigable lakes in
common use jurisdictions is thus limited in two ways: first, the state
cannot restrict bed uses so extensively as to "confiscate" the bed
owner's property without compensation; second, the state cannot authorize bed uses which are prohibited by the rules of reasonableness
and/or riparian-ness, since such authorization would constitute an
uncompensated "taking" of the riparian owners' right of common use.
But, within these constraints, zoning of nonnavigable lake bed uses
can still perform two essential functions. First, zoning ordinances can
serve a delineatory function by particularly describing the uses which
are permissible under the applicable judicial rule. Second, zoning
ordinances can be useful devices through which to implement a new
legislative policy creating additional restrictions on bed filling and
building beyond those imposed by the courts.
The capacity of zoning ordinances to particularize factual situations
is especially valuable as a means of eliminating some of the uncertainty which has been inherent in the court-administered tests of rea-

74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 652 (1968).
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sonableness and riparian-ness. By precisely delineating' 1 8 what uses
are "reasonable" or "riparian" (depending upon the jurisdiction), zoning ordinances can enable lake bed owners to utilize their property to
its full legal potential by ameliorating fears of later judicial restraint.
In a ".reasonableness" jurisdiction, lake bed zoning could set forth
legislative declarations of reasonableness thus supplanting judicial
"reasonable use" assessments, just as dry land zoning superseded much
of the prior nuisance theory. Judicial review would then be limited to
the issue of arbitrariness or some similarly restricted question."19
In Washington, Back v. Sarich prohibits the legislature from authorizing non-riparian uses, but particularization of uses would still be
helpful. Under Back, even a riparian use must be reasonable, and

statutory specification of bulk and size limitations for clearly riparian
structures (e.g. docks) 20 could serve as a legislative pronouncement
that those structures which conform are reasonable. As to uses which
are only arguably riparian in character (e.g., a houseboat), a legislative
designation of the use as "riparian" would undoubtedly influence the
conclusions of the courts (unless, of course, the statute purports to

authorize a clearly non-riparian use, such as a factory, which would
constitute an impermissible interference with riparian rights of common use).
Beyond delineation of uses, zoning can also serve as the operational
embodiment of public policies intended to extend the restrictions on

§ 26.12.040(k) (1968), providing for moorages for private
'x SEAT=LE, WASH., COD
pleasure craft, is an example of the particularized zoning to which we are referring:
(k) Moorages for private pleasure craft only, provided that when covered such
moorages meet the following requirements:
(1) The roof line shall not exceed sixteen feet above high-water lake level.
(2) Covered structures shall abut upon the natural shore line.
(3) Covered structures shall be located five feet or more from side lot lines.
(4) Any side walls and roof shall consist of rigid or semi-rigid materials.
(5) The roof area of such covered moorages shall not exceed one thousand square
feet in area and such roofs shall not be supported by extended piling.
(6) Such covered structures shall not occupy more than fifty percent of the width
of the lot at the natural shore line upon which it is located.
(7) Any boat using such moorage shall not be used as a place of residence when
so moored. (Emphasis in original.)
2
' Judicial review of a zoning ordinance has generally been restricted to review for
arbitrariness or capriciousness. Typical is this statement in Bishop v. Town of Houghton,
69 Wn. 2d 786, 792-93, 420 P.2d 368, 372 (1966):
Courts . . . cannot and should not invade the legislative arena or intrude upon
municipal zoning determinations, absent a clear showing of arbitrary, unreasonable,
irrational or unlawful zoning action or inaction.
'See, e.g., SEATLE, WAsH., CODE § 26.12.040(k) (1968), supra note 118.
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fills and structural uses of nonnavigable lake beds beyond those imposed by judicial rule. In this context, zoning can serve only a negative
function; that is, it can only deny authorization to uses that would be
permissible under the judicial rules. For example, under the "waterrelated" use test of Back, the zoning authority would be without power
to affirmatively authorize uses which are not in fact "water-related,"
for to do so, according to the Bach court, would be an illegal interference with the riparian rights of common use in spite of the state
authorization. 121 Similarly, in a "reasonable use" jurisdiction, the legislative body may not authorize a clearly unreasonable use. 22 Under
either rule, the zoning authorities could not sanction fills or buildings
2
so extensive as to render recreational use impractical. 1
Zoning can, however, impose further negative restrictions on lake
bed fills and buildings, if they do not amount to uncompensated confiscations of bed owners' property rights.2 4 Thus, restrictions short of
total open space zoning, but more stringent than the bare tests of
"'As to navigable for title lakes in Washington, the rule is apparently precisely the
opposite. Justice Hill in the recent decision of Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d
307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), ordered removal of a trailer park fill in navigable Lake
Chelan, Washington on grounds that it was an unlawful interference with a public right
of navigation. But in dictum Justice Hill suggested that the problem of fills
. . perhaps could be solved by the establishment of harbor lines in certain areas
within which fills could be made, together with carefully planned zoning by appropriate authorities to preserve for the people of this state the lake's navigational and
recreational possibilities.
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 317-18 n.13, 462 P.2d at 239 n.13. The plain implication of this statement is that the state could authorize fills and buildings in navigable waters. For further
discussion of the Wilbour opinion, see Corker, supra note 8.
'The
fence cases indicate that such a result would indeed transpire. For example, in
Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959), the court enjoined, under a "reasonable use" theory, maintenance of fences blocking one riparian's access to the lake surface,
deploring the situation as
. . . a classic example of the unpleasant and impractical state of affairs that would
result from the application of a rule that each owner could erect a barricade on his
boundary line, even though it was of the kind, such as a fence, that would not
disturb the waters in place, but would prevent adjacent owners from enjoying the
ordinary pleasures of the lake.
The fence was enjoined as a transgression of the rights of the complaining riparian. A
solid structure accomplishing the same result would have been equally objectionable.
Authorization of such a structure by the state would be logically just as unreasonable
a transgression of the riparian's rights. Therefore, despite zoning authorization, the structure would be similarly enjoinable. However, if a lake was completely unsuitable for
recreational use, such a structure might well be "reasonable" since it would not interfere
with any recreational uses.
An exception to the confinement of the zoning power to a negative function is present
in the case of the "private" lake, to which the judicial limitations would not apply (see
notes 88-94 and accompanying text svpra), thus allowing zoning to operate affirmatively
without transgression of riparian rights.
2' See notes 112-116 and accompanying text supra.
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reasonableness and riparian-ness can probably be enacted. The desirability of such additional limitations will naturally depend upon local
conditions, including the degree of commitment to (and need for) a
policy of small lake preservation.
A further advantage of zoning over the present judicial regulation is
that zoning can be discriminatory in its creation of restrictions beyond
the judicial limitations. Especially scenic lakes, or lakes to which public
access is available, for example, may require stricter controls than a
lake to which there is no present public access or which is ill-suited for
recreation, and a lake which is entirely useless for recreation may
merit no additional restrictions at all. With respect to a particular lake,
some portions of its bed and surface may require different treatment
than other portions-a deep and broad section of the lake might be
worthy of controls as strict as constitutionally permissible, whereas a
narrow, shallow, and marshy neck of the lake might warrant no legislative control at all. Furthermore, zoning regulations can prefer some
types of uses over others (park fill, for instance, over private docks).
Such discrimination, however, must not deny equal protection of the
laws. Heavy restrictions on construction on one lake, and no control at
all on a substantially identical neighboring lake might indeed violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."2 5 But different lake situations would justify differences in zoning treatment,
without violation of the equal protection clause, which thus allows
ample room for particularized zoning that is justified by the facts. This
flexibility of regulation is thus a primary advantage of the zoning apparatus over the judicially-administered system.
In the "common use" states, whether adherance is to the rule of
creasonableness" or "riparian-ness," judicial limitations function to
preserve all but the "private" small lake by preventing private parties
from constructing, and the state from authorizing, fills and buildings
thereon.'26 Zoning can supplement such judicial limitations by placing
2= Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and A Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L.
RATHEoPop, supra note 112, at 7-1-7-4.
2 In non-common use jurisdictions which do not recognize a right of recreational use
as a limitation on fills and structural uses of small lakes, as, for instance, the "eastern"
rule states (see note 23 and accompanying text supra), zoning, or some other form of
legislative regulation, is the only mechanism available for effectuating a conservationist
goal of small lake preservation. This is also true as to the "private" lakes to which the
judicial rules of limitation are not applicable (see notes 88-94 and accompanying text
supra).

REv. 542, 605-06 (1958); 1

Washington Law Review

Vol. 45: 2.7, 1970

additional restrictions (short of confiscation) on lake bed uses; by
discriminating (within the limits of the equal protection clause) among
various lakes, portions of lakes, and uses of lakes; and by delineating
the various uses permissible under the judicial limitations (so long as
clearly unauthorized uses are not sanctioned), even if greater restriction is not desirable. Thus, zoning can be quite helpful, and, indeed,
may be to some extent indispensable, considering the "deterring effect"
which a judicial rule and the costs of litigation are likely to have on all
bed uses whose riparian-ness and/or reasonableness are not obvious."u
B. Beyond Zoning-Some Other Techniques
Even though capable of some discriminate application, most zoning
is nonetheless general insofar as it is ordinarily applied comprehensively to an entire area. Other techniques are more readily adapted to
particularized treatment of a single area at a time. Without purporting
to engage in any deep analysis of these techniques, we here notice three
of them simply to indicate their greater potential for more individualized application. These three techniques are: (1) condemnation of
lake beds, (2) condemnation of developmental rights, and (3) private
agreements among bed and riparian owners.
1. Condemnation of Privately-Owned Nonnavigable Lake Beds
Condemnation of the lake bed is in many respects an ultimate solution. That is to say, a state (or locality) as owner of the condemned
lake bed can preserve the lake surface for total open space, for only the
owner of the bed can build or fill thereon. 2 8 Moreover, possible constiI"'There has been some comment on whether such zoning would be more properly
undertaken by the state or by local zoning authorities. Waite, The Dilemma of Water
Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 542, 600-04; Waite, Pleasure
Boating in a Federal Union, BurFaLo L. Rv. 427, 443-47 (1961) (recreational as opposed
to structural use zoning). It has been suggested that local pressures might obstruct
effective zoning at the local level, and this fear is probably not without basis. On the
other hand, nonnavigable lakes are quite small and ordinarily situated within one
municipality (if within municipal boundaries at all); in this case, local control would
seem best adapted to implementation of local policies. However, as to small lakes not
located within an incorporated area, standardized state zoning may be the only practical
alternative.
'In those states in which title to the beds of small lakes is held by the state, an
upland owner still has a riparian right to construct a dock to gain access to boatable
waters. See, e.g., Colson v. Salzman, 272 Wis. 397, 75 N.W.2d 421, 423 (1956). An
interesting speculation is whether such a right could exist in favor of an upland owner
after condemnation of bed title. The likelihood is that the state's ownership of the bed
after condemnation would be held to differ in this respect from the trust ownership
situation. However, absent condemnation of riparian as well as bed rights, it can not be
known with assurity that the riparian would not be able to extend a dock over the lake
surface.
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tutional objections present in the case of total open space zoning of the
lake surface can thus be avoided.
Many cities have in fact acquired the beds and surrounding upland
of their small lakes in order to conserve them for park purposes. 2 9 But
to undertake a general program of condemnation of the beds and
upland of our small lakes would be prohibitively expensive at present
land values. Condemnation of only the lake beds would reduce the cost
substantially, since the value of most lake beds is likely to be modest,
especially if acquisition precedes planning for construction and development. Further cost reductions can be achieved if the condemning
authority acquires only those portions of the lake bed which are not
yet filled or built upon.
Thus, government bed ownership would permit absolute negative
restraint of fills and buildings on the lake bed; but affirmative actions
by the government would still be subject to the limitations of existing
judicial rules. If only the bed of a lake is condemned, riparian rights
will continue to exist, since these rights ordinarily attach to the upland; 130 and the state could not violate these rights by authorizing or
undertaking an unreasonable or non-riparian use of the bed. Thus,
while bed condemnation would be an adequate technique for preserving open spaces, condemnation of riparian rights as well would be
essential if the state desires to develop the lake surface to an extent
beyond the judicial definition of the bed owner's privilege.
The main disadvantage of the condemnation of lake beds technique
is its potentially prohibitive cost. Another problem is the inherent
difficulty of ascertaining the rights of the various bed owners when the
lake bed boundaries have not been surveyed.' 1 The advantages of the
condemnation of lake beds approach are that it affords a flexibility of
control, and, because it is unhampered by the constitutional limitations
which face the zoning process, it is capable of maintaining a completely
open lake surface.

2See note 95 supra.
'See
authorities cited in note 26 supra.
mFor illustrations of the complications possible in drawing under water boundary
lines see Mutual Chemical Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 33 F. Supp. 881
(D. Md. 1940), modified sub nom. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Crown Cork
and Seal Co., 122 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Grill v. Meydenbauer Bay Yacht Club, 61
Wn. 2d 432, 378 P.2d 423 (1963); Hilleary v. Meyer, 91 Idaho 775, 430 P.2d 666 (1967).
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2. Condemning Developmental Rights
Instead of condemnation of the fee to the lake bed, the local or state
government may acquire only a conservation easement. A number of
jurisdictions have employed this approach in recent years. Under this
technique, the bed owner retains title to his property, but conveys his
power to conserve the natural state of the bed to the governmental
unit. Compensation for this right is computed by subtracting the value
of the land with no possibility of development from its former value
with developmental potential; after condemnation, the owner will be
taxed only on the unimprovable land value. Special legislation, however, may be necessary to authorize use of this procedure.132
Although condemnation of developmental rights on a lake bed would
be less costly than a similar condemnation of such rights on dry land,
or a condemnation of the lake bed itself, still cost is a factor which
significantly affects the feasibility of this technique. Condemnation of
scenic easements would preserve lakes as open space for recreation
and view purposes, but the limitations on development by the governmental body would persist, because title to the bed would remain in
private ownership.
3. Private Agreements among Riparians and Bed Owners
Private control through deed or contract restrictions is another available tool for conservation of lake surfaces.' 33 The major obstacle to the
success of this type of control is the difficulty of obtaining concurrence
among all bed and upland owners. Nevertheless, subdividers and developers could use reciprocal deed covenants in their development of as
yet untarnished lake areas in order to assure maximum preservation
of open space for common use. Ordinarily, such private controls can
operate only to impose additional restrictions on bed use, since only
unanimous private agreement can potentially derogate from judicial

"For a general discussion of scenic easements, see W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE
FOR UR3AN AMERICA: CONsERvATiON EASEMENTS (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 36) (1959). For a Wisconsin case upholding the condemnation of scenic easements along the Mississippi River see Kamroski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d
793 (1966).
'An example of private control can be seen in Hammet v. Rosensohn, 26 N.J. 415,
140 A.2d 377 (1958), aff'g 46 N.J. Super. 527, 135 A.2d 6 (1957) where a riparian's construction of a bath and boathouse over the surface of a nonnavigable lake was prevented
by enforcement of a deed restriction. (Absent the restriction, the use would have been
clearly permissible under New Jersey law.)
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limitations, and not even unified consent can avoid a zoning restriction. Such private controls will thus probably be rare, yet the technique
is available and useful where a group of riparians and bed owners
decide that the advantages of an open lake surface outweigh the loss of
lake bed developmental rights.
CONCLUSION
The conflicts between private bed owners and holders of riparian
rights will doubtless increase as our population grows and urban areas
expand. Only a combination of judicial and legislative methods holds
any hope of resolving these conflicts and protecting the public interest
in conserving our small lakes for recreation and open space. At a
minimum, we suggest that any effective approach to this nonnavigable
lake problem should include two components.
The first essential element is a judicial rule-either the traditional
test of "reasonableness" or the "riparian use" test of Bach v. Sarich.
Such a judicial limitation is required to reconcile bed and surface uses
by denying rights of exclusive use to either bed owners or surface users,
and to operate as a check on overly permissive or politically-pressured
public authorities who might permit such extensive fills and construction on some lakes as to render them unusable for recreation.
The second element necessary to a solution of this problem is legislative regulation in the form of zoning, which can furnish the specificity
required to overcome the inherent uncertainty of the terms "reasonable" and "riparian." Zoning can also impose restrictions more stringent than the judicial limitations, and can fashion particularized and
discriminating regulations to control particular lake, riparian, and use
situations. Zoning is especially important in the case of "private" lakes,
to which judicial limitations might not apply.
Beyond zoning, condemnation of lake beds or conservation easements
may be appropriate in certain cases where total open space zoning
might constitute a "taking" of property without "just compensation,"
but it is still deemed desirable to maintain a particular lake entirely
free of structural uses and fills, in order to maximize its scenic and
recreational aspects. Cost factors limit the feasibility of such condemnation techniques, however, and such specific procedures cannot
match the general comprehensiveness of zoning controls. Private con-
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trols through deed or contract provisions will be useful in those cases
where individual bed owners and riparians desire greater restrictions
than public officials are willing to establish.
In this new decade, population growth and urban expansion will be
accompanied by increased developmental pressure on our nation's small
lakes. We would thus close by stressing the urgent need for prompt
action on the part of urban planners and other officials if comprehensive controls are to become operational before more of our small lakes
fall prey to the accelerated onslaught of private development.

